People vs. Salle
G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995

Case Doctrine: 

No pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final. 

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable.


Facts: 

After having convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson, Salle and Mengote appealed their case to SC. While their cases were pending, they were granted conditional pardon by the President on December 9, 1993. Mengote immediately left for his province without consulting her lawyer. Salle, on the other hand, filed an urgent motion to withdraw appeal. The Supreme Court granted Salle's motion.

Considering that Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw appeal, the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for Mengote to submit their memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional pardon.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the conditional pardon granted to Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of his appeal. Mengote's counsel, on the other hand, submits that the conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., Mengote's counsel argued that although Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of his conviction.

Issue: 

Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.

Held: 

Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads as follows:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Citing the above provision, the Court ruled that no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final. It held that a judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.

The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. 

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.

The Court gave Mengote's counsel thirty (30) days from notice within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to the Court. The Court said that the conditional pardon granted the Mengote shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal and in case of non-compliance with the Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back Mengote into his custody.