People vs. Casido
G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997

Case Doctrine: 

There must be a final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended. 

Facts: 

Casido and Alcorin were members of the CPP/NPA who were convicted of murder. In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, they applied for pardon as well as for amnesty under Proclamation No. 347. They were granted conditional pardon during the pendency of their appeal. Their applications for amnesty were also favorably acted upon.

Issue: 

Whether or not the pardon and amnesty was valid.


Held: 

The pardon was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. The grant of amnesty, on the other hand, was valid. Proclamation No. 347 under which Casido and Alcorin voluntarily applied was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994. The release of  Casido and Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the "pardon.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (People vs. Casido, G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997)